ON FELICITY

Of animals, some are capable of felicity, while others are incapable. Felicity cannot subsist without virtue; and, this is impossible to any lacking reason; so that those animals are incapable of felicity who are destitute of reason. The blind cannot exercise or practise sight, nor can the irrational attain to the work and virtue dependent on reason. To that which possesses reason, felicity is a work, and virtue an art. Of rational animals, some are self-perfect, in need of nothing external, either for their existence, or artistic achievement. Such indeed is God. On the contrary those animals are not self-perfect whose perfection is not due to themselves, or who are in need of anything external. Such an animal; is man. Of not self-perfect animals some are perfect, and others not. The former derive their subsistence from both their own proper causes, and from the external. They derive it indeed from their own causes, because they obtain from thence both an excellent nature; and deliberate choice; but from external causes, because they receive from thence equitable legislation, and good rulers. The animals which are not perfect are either such as participate of neither of these, or of some one of those, or whose souls are entirely depraved. Such will be the man who is of a description different from the above.

Moreover, of perfect men there are two kinds. Some of them are naturally perfect, while others are perfect only in relation to their lives. Only the good are naturally perfect, and these possess virtue. For the virtue of the [of] anything is a consummation and perfection. Thus the virtue of the eye is the eye's nature's [--] consummation and perfection. So man's virtue is man's nature's consummation and perfection.

Those also are perfect according to life, who are not only good, but happy. For indeed felicity is the perfection of human life. But human life is a system of actions; and felicity completes actions. Virtue and fortune, also complete life; (but only partially; virtue according to use; and good fortune according to prosperity. God, therefore, is neither good through learning virtue f rom anyone, nor is he happy through being attended by good fortune. For he is good and happy by nature, and always was, is and never will cease to be; since he is incorruptible, and naturally good. But man is neither happy nor good by nature, requiring discipline and providential care. To become good, he requires virtue; but to become happy, good fortune. On this account, human felicity may be summarily said to consist of these two things: praise, and being called happy. Praise indeed, because of virtue; but being called happy, from prosperity. Therefore it possesses virtue, through divine destiny; but prosperity through a mortal allotment. But mortal concerns depend on divine ones, and terrestrial on celestial. Likewise, subordinate things depend on the more excellent. That is why the good man who follows the Gods is happy, but he who follows mortal nature is unhappy. For to him who possesses wisdom, prosperity is good and useful; being good, through his knowledge of the use of it; but it is useful through his cooperating with actions. It is beautiful, therefore when prosperity is present with intellect, and when, as it we were sailing with a prosperous wind, action are performed that tend towards virtue; just as a pilot watches the motions of the stars. Thus he who does this will not only follow God, but will also harmonize human with divine good.

This also is evident, that human life becomes different from disposition and action. But it is necessary that the disposition should be either worthy or depraved; and that action should be attended with either felicity or misery. A worthy disposition indeed participates of virtue, while a bad one of vice. With respect to actions, also, those that are prosperous are attended with felicity; (for they derive their completion by looking to reason;) but those that are unfortunate, are attended with misery; for they are disappointed of their end. Hence it is not only necessary to learn virtue, but also to possess and use it; either for security, or growth; (of property, when it is too small), or, which is the greatest thing of all, for the improvement of families and cities. For it is not only necessary to have the possession of things beautiful, but also their use. All these things, however, will take place, when a man lives in a city that enjoys equitable laws. This is what is signified by the horn of Amalthea; for all things are contained in equitable legislation. Without this, the greatest good of human nature can neither be effected, nor, when effected, can be increased and become permanent. For this contains both virtue and tendency towards it; because excellent natures are generated according to it. Likewise manners, studies and laws through this subsist in the most excellent condition; and besides these, rightly-decided reason, and piety and sanctity towards the most honorable natures.

Therefore he who is to be happy, and whose life is to be prosperous, should live and [work] in a country governed by equitable laws, relinquishing all lawlessness. All the above is necessary for man is a part of society, and according to the same reasoning will become entirely [im]perfect, if he associates with others, but not in a becoming manner. For some things are naturally adapted to subsist in many things, and not in one thing; others in one thing and not in many; others both in many and in one, and on this account in one thing because in many. For indeed harmony, symphony and number are naturally adapted to be insinuated into many things. Nothing which makes a whole from these parts is sufficient in itself. But acuteness of seeing and hearing, and swiftness of feet, subsist in one thing alone. Felicity, however, and virtue of soul, subsist both in one thing and many, in a whole, and in the universe. On this account they subsist in one thing, because they also subsist in many; and they subsist in many because, they inhere in the whole and the universe. For the orderly distribution of the whole nature of things methodically arranges each particular. The orderly distribution of particulars gives completion to the whole of things, and to the universe. But this follows from the whole being naturally prior to the part, and not the part to the whole. For if the world was not, neither the sun nor the moon would exist, not the planets, nor the fixed stars. But the world existing, each of these also exists.

The truth of this may also be seen in the nature itself of animals. For if the animal had no existence, there would be neither eye, mouth, or ear. But the animal existing, each of these likewise exists. However, as the whole is to the part, so is the virtue of the whole to that of the part. For if harmony did not exist, nor a divine inspection of human affairs, adorned things could no longer remain in good condition. Were there no equitable legislation in a city, the citizen could be neither good nor happy. Did the animal lack health, neither foot nor hand could be in health. The world's virtue is harmony; the city's virtue is equitable legislation, and the bodyÕs virtue are health and strength. Likewise, each of the parts is adjusted to the whole and the universe. For the eye sees on account of the whole body; and the other parts and members are adjusted for the sake of the whole (body) and the universe.